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Fossil Fuels, Development and Aid: Should More Be Done to Help?
Abstract
Previous works have demonstrated that developing nations rich in fossil fuels typically suffer from lower levels of
economic growth than nations without them. Increased foreign aid in these countries could potentially reverse their
misfortunes and improve their overall welfare. Three indicators were selected in this study to gauge national welfare;
economic growth, improvements in national institutions and changes in life expectancy over time. Using a dataset of
more than 100 nations collected from 1983-2010, however, I found foreign aid to have nearly zero effect on any of
these measurements of national welfare within fossil fuel rich nations.
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Topic and Significance 
This paper covers the topic of economic development in countries rich in oil and natural 
gas. Previous studies have been conducted that demonstrated the difficulties of these resource-
rich nations to grow at the same pace as their counterparts (Gylfason, 2001; Lynn Karl, 2004; 
Samargandi, Fidrmuc, & Ghosh, 2014). Due to the demonstrable struggles of these countries, it 
is worth asking if foreign aid efforts should be concentrated on them. Some studies have brought 
into question the effectiveness of foreign aid in encouraging prosperity within any developing 
nation regardless of resources (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2006; Kurihara, n.d.). But 
for the purposes of this paper, perhaps the relationship of aid with nations saddled by oil and 
natural gas is fundamentally different and could even make an influx in foreign assistance crucial 
to changing their otherwise bleak outlook. 
 
1.2 Why Do Resource Rich Countries Struggle? 
Reasons for the slow growth of nations that are leaders in fossil fuel production are 
bountiful. One of the most often cited is the Dutch Disease (Gylfason, 2001). The Dutch Disease 
was coined by the magazine The Economist to describe the demise of the manufacturing sector 
in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959. This is a problem that 
is often found in countries with one dominant industry, typically oil or natural gas. Developing 
nations, by very definition, do not have particularly robust and diverse economies. The discovery 
of ‘black gold’ — oil — or natural gas can become an immediate boon to the economy. When a 
developing nation becomes an exporter of oil or natural gas, the sector can swell with a sudden 
burst of foreign demand. But this is not as beneficial to a nation as it may appear. As foreign 
currency pours into the nation and is exchanged for the domestic currency to purchase these 
resources, the value of the domestic currency surges. Suddenly, other industries begin to see the 
market for their goods dry up as the strength of the domestic currency causes the purchasing 
power of foreigners to shrivel, depleting their demand for the goods. What was once an 
economic boon to the nation now suffocates its industries. As economic diversity within the 
country dwindles, this can make exporters of fossil fuels even more susceptible to shocks in 
energy prices. 
Another oft-cited reason for the slow growth of resource rich nations is rent-seeking 
(Lynn Karl, 2004). Rent was defined by classical economist Adam Smith as being any type of 
earnings made in excess of relevant costs of production. Essentially, rent-seeking is the profits 
made from demonstrating market power rather than real economic production. This can manifest 
itself in many ways. For example, businesses can petition the government (or even bribe it) to 
create barriers to external competition. This might be done through introducing tariffs or creating 
domestic subsidies on the production of goods in a specific industry. A lack of competitive 
pricing through either of these means will allow companies to charge well above the actual costs 
of production. This distorts the efficient allocation of resources throughout the entire country, 
disproportionately accruing within the industry that wields the market power.  
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Other obstacles to development in oil and natural gas producing nations are noted in 
different studies as being the unpredictability of the energy market, lack of education and the 
deterioration of government (Lynn Karl, 2004).  
 
1.3 Does Aid Even Work at All? 
Many studies have been devoted to the topic of whether aid is even effective at all. 
Rightfully so, as foreign aid has ballooned into a trillion-dollar industry. The results of these 
studies have been discouraging. Many of them have concluded that aid has a negligible effect on 
the development of the receiving countries regardless of resources (Djankov et al., 2006; 
Kurihara, n.d.).  
There are many criticisms of foreign aid, from the way it is distributed to the way it is 
implemented. Research has shown that nations receive aid  based on political feasibility rather 
than where it will be best served (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). And the level of a corruption within 
the government of a receiving nation has no effect on the amount of aid that it receives, meaning 
that a lot of the money that is disbursed does not reach the people it is meant to serve (Alesina & 
Weder, 2002). People have also argued that aid agencies have broad and overlapping goals. 
Rather than setting small, distinct goals to measure development, agencies instead set out with 
goals like ‘eradicating poverty’ or ‘achieving universal primary education’ such as are laid out in 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. And when these wide-sweeping goals are 
inevitably not met, there is no level of accountability. Every aid agency set out to achieve the 
same goals. Therefore, there is no one to bear responsibility for failure.  
As the economic merits of foreign aid have begun to diminish, the effects of aid on 
human development are worth measuring. Shockingly, little research has been done to 
understand the effects of aid on the physical well-beings of individual recipients. One study on 
the effects of aid within the health sector, however, found that the concentration of health-
specific aid did not have significant effects on general measures of physical well-being. These 
measures were life expectancy, death rate, infant mortality and immunization rate of measles and 
DPT (Williamson, 2008). None of the aforementioned variables of interest consistently returned 
a significant positive correlation with foreign aid. 
In terms of institutions, the results for aid are slightly more inspiring, albeit minimally. 
Corruption has been found to decrease in nations that receive aid (Tavares, 2003). Additionally, 
foreign aid has been found to have a small but statistically positive effect on government 
institutions. The metric for institutions was a composite of several different aspects: checks 
within government branches, levels of political terrorism, constraints on executive power, 
democracy and the political independence of the judicial system (Jones & Tarp, 2016). Whether 
these small, positive results are worth continuing the steady expansion of aid funding is not for 
me to say and will not be discussed here.  
The purpose of this study is to distinguish the effects of foreign aid specifically on fossil 
fuel rich nations. While the results of foreign aid overall have not inspired much excitement, 
there is a possibility that for this specific subset of countries that there are real positive effects. If 
there are, they should be observed before making any decisions. And there is real hope. The 
positive effects of aid on institutions and reducing corruption could be more valued in these 
2
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/15
countries who struggle with mismanagement of their largest natural assets. And if aid can 
improve the economic well-being of other industrial sectors, it may help these countries to 
diversify and make them less prone to shocks in energy prices. Finally, while Claudia 
Williamson has already performed a sweeping summary of aid’s effect on the health sector, she 
did not control for countries rich in natural resources. The general well-being of citizens in these 
countries is worth monitoring in case of unforeseeable effects of aid on their physical health. The 
combination of economic growth, institutional fortitude and life expectancy should give a well-
rounded image of the role that aid does — or doesn’t — play in improving the welfare of this 
specific subset of countries. It is for those reasons that these variables of interest have been 
selected. 
 
Methods 
 The data was extracted from a 2016 study conducted by Sam Jones and Finn Tarp. The 
authors derived their numbers on aggregate aid, fossil fuels, life expectancy, economic growth 
and other relevant variables from the database, AidData. The numbers on institutions were taken 
from a separate location called the Quality of Government database. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the variables the authors determined as appropriate indicators for institutional 
strength were as follows; checks within government branches, levels of political terrorism, 
constraints on executive power, democracy and the political independence of the judicial system. 
For the purposes of the study, it should be beneficial to use another author’s definition of 
institutional strength. This eliminates possible bias that would come from creating a personal 
definition that would be potentially malleable in order to meet desired results.  
Since the study specifically observes the change in institutional strength over time, a 
variable was generated that measured the difference between the present strength of institutions 
and a lag of the same variable. The same approach was taken in creating a variable that measured 
changes in life expectancy. The original dataset also did not provide nominal GDP, but rather the 
logarithmic form of national GDP per capita. It was necessary to invert this logarithm, as well as 
the logarithmic form of national population, to derive the numbers for population and GDP per 
capita. The numbers were multiplied to derive nominal GDP which was then used to solicit the 
rate of growth of each country after the data was organized in a time series panel. As for the 
main explanatory variable — total aid as a percent of GDP — it was important to use a lag. Since 
we are trying to gauge the effects of aid on different indicators, it would not make sense to 
measure the indicators at the same time as the aid is received. Instead, the amount of aid a 
country received in the past year will be better in explaining present changes in GDP, institutions 
and life expectancy. To better avoid omitted variable biases, the regression also included two 
other variables: the log of the country’s population and the log of the country’s GDP. Both of 
those variables were lags as well. 
Now that the study was equipped with definite standards and measurements of its three 
indicators of national welfare, it could proceed in deriving the data. The standard OLS (ordinary 
least squares) regression model was not sufficient for this study. A lack of stationarity became 
apparent throughout this time series set. Factors such as foreign aid, GDP, and life expectancy 
have all steadily increased over time. This would skew the results of any OLS regression run on 
any of our indicators. For example, if we ran an OLS model regression and found GDP Growth 
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is correlated to higher past levels of GDP, we could not verify the validity of this relationship. 
That’s because both GDP and levels of GDP growth have increased over time anyway. So the 
highest levels of GDP will occur simultaneously with the highest levels of GDP growth anyway. 
Therefore, this relationship is due to an outside factor — time — rather than how these two 
variables interact. To compensate for this fact, it was determined a panel data fixed effects model 
would be the most appropriate. With this model, the differences that are observed over time are 
considered. The model will distinguish between the effects of time and the effects of the 
variables which will allow us to look at these relationships without distortions. For added 
consideration, all tables will include the statistics of the same model used on non-fossil fuel rich 
nations to demonstrate the contrasts between them and exporters of oil and natural gas. 
 
Data 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Non-Fossil Fuel Exporting Nations 
 Obs. Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP Growth 1,887 3.74 6.289 -51.03 106.28 
GDP Per Capita 1,986 3,252.26 3,056.69 100.89 17.441.69 
Institutional Rating 2,087 10.05 72.33 -154.88 242.07 
Life Expectancy 2,087 59.94 9.98 26.82 79.19 
Aid Received as Percent of GDP 2,087 6.15 8.45 0 122.85 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Fossil Fuel Exporting Nations 
 Obs. Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP Growth 737 4.16 6.22 -41.30 46.50 
GDP Per Capita 744 4,984.02 3698.85 247.89 15,882.04 
Institutional Rating 756 -28.38 65.74 -143.82 163.96 
Life Expectancy 756 64.18 9.02 40.89 76.90 
Aid Received as Percent of GDP 756 2.71 5.62 0 95.09 
Tables 1 and 2 are summary statistics for nations distinguished by the presence of natural 
gas or oil. As you can see, mean GDP Growth, GDP per capita and life expectancy is higher in 
the nations with natural gas or oil. Mean institutional rating and the amount of aid received, 
however, are lower. T-tests verify the statistical significance of every one of these differences 
with the sole exception of GDP growth. 
Now that we have a basic understanding of the conditions in these nations, it is important 
to find what it is about a country that determines the amount of aid that it can expect to receive. 
To do so, a fixed effects model was run with the amount of aid as a percent of GDP explained by 
the lagged form of several variables. All the explanatory variables are lagged since the amount of aid 
rewarded in a given year is better explained by the conditions of the nation in the previous year. The 
results of that model are listed below in Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Amount of Aid Received as a Percent of GDP Depending on Different Variables, Fixed Effects Model 
 Coefficients with Standard Deviation 
Log of GDP (lag) -6.898 
(.643) 
Log of Pop (lag) 4.291 
(1.728) 
Life Expectancy (lag) .138 
(.045) 
Presence of Oil/Gas (lag) -.575 
(.606) 
Institutional Strength (lag) .011 
(.003) 
Constant 90.695 
R-squared within/between/overall .611 
Note: Bold indicates a correlation that’s significant with 95% confidence.  
  
Table 3 shows that as a nation’s GDP rises, it can expect to receive less foreign aid. As its 
population rises, it can expect to receive more. This is fairly intuitive. More aid is also correlated 
with stronger institutions, though slightly. What does not have any statistical significance in a 
country’s ability to solicit aid is the presence of fossil fuels. This seems contradictory to the 
descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2, but both can hold true. It just requires that nations with 
and without oil are fundamentally different from each other in GDP, population and other factors 
that determine the amount of foreign aid it receives. But if aid is disbursed indiscriminately of oil 
and natural gas reserves, it makes it more imperative to determine if it is effective in those fossil 
fuel-rich nations. The analysis of which begins below in Table 4. 
Table 4: Different Variables’ Effects on a Nation’s GDP Growth, Fixed Effects Model 
 Non-Fossil Fuel Exporting Nation Fossil Fuel Exporting Nation 
Total Aid as Percent of GDP (lag) .104 
(.023) 
-.015 
(.045) 
Log of Pop. (lag) 1.640 
(2.025) 
-13.056 
(4.268) 
Log of GDP (lag) -8.814 
(.810) 
-8.629 
(1.306) 
1-Yr Change in Inst. .014 
(.005) 
.005 
(.010) 
1-Yr Change in Life Exp. .713 
(.337) 
2.024 
(.746) 
Constant 179.706 435.625 
R-squared within/between/overall .144/.000/.001 .198/.028/.002 
Note: Bold indicates a correlation that’s significant with 95% confidence.  
 
The first variable of interest that is analyzed was the effect of aid on the economic growth 
of the nation. Table 4 demonstrates that foreign aid has a near zero effect on the rate of growth 
within nations that are exporters of oil or natural gas. This is in direct contrast of the effect of 
foreign aid on the nations without fossil fuels where the model suggests a statistically significant, 
positive effect on GDP growth, however small. Other takeaways from Table 4 include the 
5
Walker: Fossil Fuels, Development and Aid: Should More Be Done to Help?
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
significant burden of a larger population on economic growth in fossil fuel rich nations that is not 
present in countries without them. Also, the positive effect of improving national institutions on 
economic growth is notably voided in nations that export oil or natural gas. And finally, the 
benefits of improved life expectancy on GDP growth is markedly stronger in nations with fossil 
fuels.  
Table 5: Different Variables’ Effects on a Nation’s 1-Yr Change in Life Expectancy, Fixed Effects Model 
 Non-Fossil Fuel Exporting Nation Fossil Fuel Exporting Nation 
Total Aid as Percent of GDP (lag) .008 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
Log of Pop. (lag) -.427 
(.143) 
-.141 
(.222) 
Log of GDP (lag) -.470 
(.058) 
-.273 
(.069) 
1-Yr Change in Inst. .000 
(.000) 
.001 
(.001) 
GDP Growth .004 
(.002) 
.005 
(.001) 
Constant 17.713 9.460 
R-squared within/between/overall .126/.012/.000 .125/.033/.005 
Note: Bold indicates a correlation that’s significant with 95% confidence. 
  
The next variable that was observed was aid’s effect on changes in life expectancy. 
Again, in nations that are exporters of fossil fuels, the positive effects of foreign aid are no 
longer present. Interestingly, though unrelated to the main topic, the negative effects of 
population size and economy size that are noted in countries without fossil fuels are mitigated in 
the nations with them. In either category, however, GDP growth is a consistent means of 
improving the life expectancy within a country’s population. If improving the well-being of 
people within developing nations is a priority, this should suggest that improving the economic 
standards of living in these countries is a consistent way to do so.  
Table 6: Different Variables’ Effects on a Nation’s 1-Yr Change in Institutions, Fixed Effects Model 
 Non-Fossil Fuel Exporting Nation Fossil Fuel Exporting Nation 
Total Aid as Percent of GDP (lag) .042 
(.104) 
.102 
(.174) 
Log of Pop. (lag) 8.347 
(9.051) 
-12.205 
(16.754) 
Log of GDP (lag) -2.665 
(.3.740) 
-2.565 
(5.255) 
GDP Growth .287 
(.106) 
.084 
(.151) 
1-Yr Change in Life Exp. -.300 
(.1.506) 
2.910 
(2.924) 
Constant -78.224 244.158 
R-squared within/between/overall .046/.025/.008 .068/.005/.006 
Note: Bold indicates a correlation that’s significant with 95% confidence.  
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The final variable of interest that was examined was the effect of foreign aid on the 
propensity of a country to enact positive changes within its national institutions. Table 6, 
however, demonstrates no statistically significant ability of foreign aid to enact positive change 
on a country’s national institutions whether they are an exporter of oil or not. In fact, only one 
explanatory variable had any statistical significance in the model for either category: GDP 
growth in a non-fossil fuel exporter was positively correlated with stronger institutions but not in 
nations that do export fossil fuels. 
 
Conclusion 
The models used in this statistical analysis does not support the notion that aid can 
provide any benefits to the overall welfare of a fossil fuel-rich nation in terms of the three 
variables of interest described in this study. While aid may have merits in non-fossil fuel 
exporting countries in improving GDP growth and improving life expectancy, those benefits do 
not exist in nations with oil or natural gas deposits.  
There are many reasons this could be the case but one theory will be offered here. 
Corruption within the governments of fossil fuel-rich nations is often associated with powerful 
and wealthy energy magnates bribing officials to rig the rules of trade in their favor (Shaxson, 
2007). Additionally, foreign aid has been found to have Dutch Disease effects of its own which 
might make pre-existing distortions in currency more pronounced in these countries (Rajan & 
Subramanian, 2011). The combination of these two factors may be responsible for the nullified 
benefits of aid on GDP growth in countries that are exporters of natural gas or oil. Since life 
expectancy is correlated with GDP growth — shown in Table 4 and 5 — these economic effects 
are likely the same reasons that the benefits of aid are mitigated with improving life expectancy 
as well. 
This study is not without its shortcomings, however. There’s a strong possibility that 
omitted variable bias is present within the models. Indeed, the models would’ve been better 
served to include the effects of aid on corruption and exchange rates within nations that are 
exporters in fossil fuels as to better justify the theory on its ineffectiveness. The models also only 
account for general trends in aid rather than incremental. It is possible that the effects of foreign 
aid vary at varying amounts. Finally, the examination of aid’s effect in this study would be better 
validated if run through more regressions other than a panel data fixed effects model to establish 
robustness. In the future, this research could become more valuable if these limitations were 
accounted for. Based on these results alone, however, it is difficult to justify continued foreign 
aid programs within fossil fuel-rich nations.  
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